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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LUCILLE JESSE MOFFAT THORNOCK,
et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents
No. 16231

vs.
LOIS s. COOK, et al.

I

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS IN
OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This
respondents,

is

an

action whereby plaintiffs-

LUCILLE JESSE MOFFAT THORNOCK, et al.,

(hereinafter "THORNOCK"), seek to quiet title, pursuant
to §78-40-1,

et seq.,. Utah Code Ann.

1977), to all minerals in,

(Repl.

Vol.

9A

upon, or under certain real

property located in Rich County, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The First Judicial District Court in and for
Rich County,

the

Honorable

VeNoy Christofferson,

pre-

siding, granted plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
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and entered

its Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title on

October

1978

23,

(R.

349,

and

358-61,

354-57,

respec-

tively).
Plaintiffs'
considered
sions.

by

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment was

the court below on three separate occa-

An initial hearing was held on April 17, 1978,

which was continued,

without date,

for

the purpose of

allowing both parties an opportunity to file additional
documents.
1978,

Cook,

A second hearing was held on September 5,

subsequent to which, defendant-appellant, Lois s.
(hereinafter

"COOK"),

filed

her

Second

Amended

Answer and Counterclaim (R. 339-48).
Subsequent to the grant of summary judgment

~

the court below, COOK filed an "Objection to Plaintiffs
Proposed

Decree

Releasing

Lis

368-72).

After

consideration
1978,

the

of Quiet Title,

Pendens

of

and

Motion

Judgment and Order
for

Reargument"

(R.

these three separate opportunities for
the

issues

involved,

on December 11,

lower court rendered its Memorandum Decision

denying COOK's Objection and Motion (R. 377).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant,

COOK,

seeks

reversal of

the lower court's Judgment of November 16, 1978, of that
court's Memorandum Decision dated December 11, 1978, and
a rehearing of her arguments on appeal.

- 2 -
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Plaintiffs-Respondents, THORNOCK,

seek affir-

mation of the Judgment of November 16, 1978, the Decree
of Quiet Title of that same date and of the Memorandum
Decision of

December

11,

1978.

In addition,

THORNOCK

seeks a denial of COOK'S Petition for Rehearing.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For

purposes of brevity, THORNOCK adopts the

Statement of Facts as contained in her Brief on Appeal.
However,

THORNOCK wishes to again emphasize that those

arguments presented by COOK pertain to only 353 of the
1,946 acres involved in this action.
COOK asserts title through adverse possession
by reason of certain alleged defects in THORNOCK's chain

of

title.

Those

alleged

defects pertain only to 353

acres (See Brief of Respondent's pg. 4).
The
reservation

court below held

contained

in

that

the language of

the Warranty Deed

dated June

30, 1950, (R.219), whereby the real property in question
was

conveyed

Lawrence

B.

by THORNOCK' s
Johnson

served

predecessor

in

interest to

to

to

the

reserve

gr an tor

all mineral rights (R. 349 and 377).
As
appeal,

the

COOK has not questioned
remainder

of

the

real

that ruling on
property

is

not

affected by COOK's assertion of adverse possession.
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ARGUMENT
Defendant-Appellant

COOK,

Support of Appellant's Pe ti ti on for
after,

"Appellant's

The first

Brief"),

in

her

Brief in

Rehearing

presents

two

(herein-

arguments.

is that an issue of fact exists as to the

validity of

the COOK-THORNOCK Quit-Claim Deed.

The

second, argued here for the first time, pertains to the
alleged

failure

of

THORNOCK

to

"specify

the

facts

supposedly establishing a prior severance of surface and
mineral

estates".

Those

arguments

will

be discussed

separately.
POINT I
THERE IS NO QUESTION OF FACT AS TO
THE VALIDITY OF THE COOKTHORNOCK QUIT CLAIM DEED
COOK again asserts that a question of fact
exists as

to

the validity of the COOK-THORNOCK Quit
This argument was considered by the lower

Claim Deed.

court on three separate occasions and by this Court on
COOK's initial appeal.
Central

to

COOK' s

renewed

argument is the

contention that in the context of a motion for summary
judgment,
evaluation

"[t]here is to be no weighing of evidence or
of

credibility

of

witnesses"

(Appellant's

Brief pg. 4).
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Admittedly,
however,

in

this

proposition

the context of this appeal,

dence before

the court

is COOK' s

is

correct,

the only evi-

testimony.

There is

simply no conflicting testimony against which it might
be weighed.
As

COOK' s

testimony

stands alone,

apparently

COOK wishes this court to question her own credibility.
In

the

absence

of

conflicting

testimony,

THORNOCK

assumes, as does this Court, that COOK testified truthfully.

In summary, she testified that (1) the signature

of Lois Cook appearing on the COOK-THORNOCK Quit Claim
Deed appears
19-24),

( 2)

Howland J.
husband,

to

be her own

(Cook depo.

pg.

13 lns.

the signature which purports to be that of
Cook

appears to be that of her deceased

(Cook depo.

pg.

13 ln.

25, pg.

14 lns.

1-2),

( 3) she knows of no facts which would tend to indicate
that the signatures which appear on the Quit Claim Deed
are other than what they purport to be, (Cook depo. pg.
14 lns.

13-16),

(4)

the request of Aden

the Quit Claim Deed was signed at

w.

Thornock (Cook depo. pg. 10 lns.

11-16), (5) although she characterized her contacts with
Aden W. Thornock as "hounding", she does not recall even
the substance of Mr. Thornock's statements during those
encounters
15-25,

pg.

(Cook depo.
45 lns.

pg.

1-5),

19 lns.
(6)

10-19, pg.

44 lns.

she was not threatened
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or coerced by Aden W. Thornock
19-25,

pg.

deceased

52,

lns.

husband was

(Cook depo.

pg.

52

1-13),

(Cook depo. pg.

(7)

neither

lns.

to her

knowledge her

threatened nor coerced

11-17,

pg.

53 lns.

2-13),

the COOK-THORNOCK Quit Claim Deed was the only
which she signed at the
depo.

pg.

51 lns.

request of Mr.

4-18),

51 lns.

and

(8)

docume~

Thornock (Cook

(9) Aden W. Thornock was

not present at the time the Quit Claim Deed was signed
(Cook depo. pg. 53 lns. 14-17).
In spite of this testimony, COOK again
at page

5 of her Brief,

that a

asser~

"triable issue of

fact .•• [is] •.. raised by the defendant's Amended Answer".
As this Court noted

in its original opinion in this

matter, a mere allegation is not sufficient to raise an
issue of fact which will preclude the grant of summary
judgment.
In

applying

may not consider
the

record,

COOK' s

statement

credibility

only one

that

the Court

or weigh the evidence on

conclusion may be

reached, i.e.,

there is no issue of fact as to the val id i ty of the
Quit-Claim Deed because
flicts.

It

credibility
evidence,

is only
and

the record contains no con-

if

this Court questions COOK'S

assumes,

even

absent

contradicting

that her testimony may be disregarded might a

question of fact be found

to exist.

Of course, the
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court may not question credibility or indulge in
speculation.

Simply stated, on the record there is no

issue of fact.
COOK also argues that summary judgment is "not
usually appropriate where the issue concerns a subjective state of mind"

(Appellant's Brief, pg.

6).

Even

assuming, arguendo, that this is correct, the issue must
first be raised.

In the context of this action, there

is no issue of fact as to coercion or duress.
A succinct and somewhat general definition of
duress

is

found

at

25 Am.Jur.

2d DURESS AND UNDUE

INFLUENCE, §1 where it is stated:
Generally speaking, duress may
be said to exist whenever one, by
the unlawful act of another, is
induced to make a contract or to
perform some other act under circumstances
which deprive him of the
exercise of free will.
The "subjective state of mind" to which COOK
refers is this deprivation of the "exercise of free
will".

In this regard, COOK has testified as follows:
Q.

[By counsel for Thornock] Did
anyone force you to sign Exhibit
"l" • . . [the Cook-Thornock
Quit Claim Deed]
• to your
deposition?

A.

No.

Q.

Did anyone threaten you?

A.

No.
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Q.

Did anyone coerce you to sign
Exhibit "l"?

A.

I signed it because my husband
asked me to.
(Cook depo. pg. 51 lns. 19-25)

Clearly, COOK was not deprived of the exercise
of her free will.

In fact, her only testimony concern-

ing the conduct of Aden

w.

Thornock was an expression of

irritation at his requests
signed

and

a

that the Quit Claim Deed be

characterization of

those

requests as

"hounding" (Cook depo. pg. 10 lns. 11-16).
Neither

COOK's

testimony,

nor

any other

evidence before this Court suffice to raise an issue of
fact as to her "subjective state of mind" at the time of
the signing of the Quit Claim Deed;

rather, the record

serves to demonstrate the absence of duress or coercion
in the execution of that document.
COOK relies on the Court's opinion
John's Bargain Stores Corp.,
1972)
ment

464 F.2d 111

in~

(5th Cir.

in support of the proposition that summary judgis

inappropriate where

the defendant's "state of

mind" is at issue.
Ross,
The

issue of

retailer

supra,
fact

was a

before

products 1 iabli ty action.

the court was whether the

of an allegedly defective product should have

known of the product's defect.

The court noted that ~e
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defendant retailer

had filed an affidavit stating that

it had

knowledge

no

plaintiffs
publicity
flicting

actual
had

filed

about

the

an

the

defect

affidavit setting

defect.

affidavits,

of

the

In

court

and

that

forth media

this context of conheld

summary

judgment

was inappropriate.
The

court's decision

in

~os~,

distinguishable from the case at hand.

~~£~,

is

In Ross, supra,

the conflicting affidavits before the court presented an
issue

of

fact

as

to

whether

the

retailer

should have

known of the product's alleged defect.

In the present

case,

is

the

court.

testimony

of

defendant

alone

before

the

That testimony demonstrates the nonexistence of

an issue

of

fact as to duress or coercion.

Simply

stated, in Ross, supra, the court was confronted with an
unquestionable

issue

of

fact

created

by

opposing

af-

fidavits while in the present situation no such issue of
fact is present.
COOK similarly urges that this Court's decision

in

Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guarantee

Ins. Underwriters, Inc.,
(1965)

stands

for

the

16 Utah

2d 211,

proposition

that

398 P.2d 685
this

Court

is

"adverse" to the grant of summary judgment where duress
or coercision

is an issue.

A careful reading of that

case reveals that it is procedurally dissimilar to the

-

9 -
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case at hand.
was

granted

summary

conference.
filed.

In Reliable Furniture,

No

In

view

judgment

Motion
of

for

this

supra, defendant

during

the

Summary Judgment

procedural

pre-trial
had been

irregularity, the

court stated:
It is appropriate to reiterate
that
the dismissal of an action at
pre-trial, which peremptorily turns
a party out of court, is a drastic
action which should be used sparingly and with great caution.
This is
especially true where the dismissal
was ordered without any motion for
summary judgment being filed to put
the party on notice of such contemplated action and afford him an
opportunity to meet it.
( 398 P. 2d
at 688) (emphasis added)
In the procedural context of that case, it is
clear

that plaintiff did not have an opportunity to

create

a

factual

record.

Based upon

this absence of

opportunity and the condition of the record,

the court

stated:
Upon consideration of the
record as it has come to us we
cannot conCiude-wT-tiisucfl-certainty
as to justify ruling as a matter of
law that there was no duress
(398 P.2d at 688) (emphasis added)
The court,

in Reliable Furniture, did not, as

COOK contends, hold that summary judgment is inappropriate where duress
held,
a

or

coercion

is

an

issue.

The court

that on the record in that particular case, where

Mo ti on

for

Summary

Judgment

- 10 -

had

not

been filed,
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plaintiff should
the present

be entitled

case,

to present evidence.

In

COOK has had three opportunities to

present any evidence whatsoever and has wholly failed so
to do.
COOK suggests that a review of transcribed
testimony

is

Motion for

an

inadequate basis

for

a decision on a

Summary Judgment because the court has not

witnessed the demeanor of the witness.
This

suggested

summary judgment would,

limitation upon

the grant of

if adopted by this court, serve

to render Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a
nullity.

If a court cannot render summary judgment

without observing the demeanor of the witness, judgment
could not be granted outside the parameters of a trial.
In summary, COOK is correct in her assertion
that

the

weighing of evidence and consideration of

credibility is inappropriate in the context of a Motion
for Summary Judgment.
her deposition
speculation
said.

In

as
this

COOK's testimony as contained in

should be given full
to

her motives or what she might have

action,

evidence cannot be weighed as

there is no conflict on the record.
lishes that

there

credit without

The record estab-

is no question of fact as to the

validity of the Quit-Claim Deed.
As

there

is no question of fact,

there is

similarly no issue as to COOK'S "state of mind" at the

- 11 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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time

of

the execution of

the

COOK-THORNOCK Quit-Claim

Deed.
COOK's

suggestion

that

transcribed

testimony

should not be the basis of a grant of Summary Judgment
simply does not comport with the law, nor the practice
of this jurisdiction.
Throughout her argument COOK has failed to
indicate one

instance in the record which serves to

create a question of fact as to the val id i ty of the
Quit-Claim Deed.
This Court's original opinion was correct,
there is no question of fact as to the validity of the
COOK-THORNOCK Quit-Claim Deed.

COOK'S Petition for

Rehearing on this basis should be denied.
POINT II.
COOK

apparently

presents

several

arguments under her heading "Point II".
be that

( 1)

diverse

They appear to

THORNOCK has failed to specify a basis for

severance of the mineral and surface estate,
she is precluded from arguing that point,

therefore

( 2) COOK has

obtained title by adverse possession because the mineral
and surface estates have not been severed,
simultaneously
severance,

·
by
is

assert

and

·
its
very

deny
na t ure,

her

(3) COOK may

title,

and ( 41

a questi' on of fact.

t ined
For purposes of clarity, those various themes con a
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in the arguments presented in COOK's second point will
be discussed separately.

A.
THE ISSUE OF SEVERANCE IS
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT
COOK, for the first time, asserts THORNOCK has
failed

to

"specify the facts supposedly establishing a

prior

severance

(Appellant's
raised

it

surface and mineral estates".

Brief pg.

before

appeal,

of

the

may

trial

not

16)

As

court,

properly

this

and
be

issue

was

not

was not raised on

considered

by

this

Court.
As

this

Court noted

Rio Grande RR Co.,

52

Utah

in Dahlquist v. Denver
438,

174 P.

833

&

(1918):

A rehearing will not be granted
on the ground that petitioner has
failed to argue an important point
on the hearing.
All points relied
~Eon in support of a case must be
£resented by the briefs and arguments on appeal, and the practice of
reserving certain points to be
argued subsequently, in the event of
an adverse decision, is condemned by
the court. (citing 84 CJ 627, 628]
(52 Utah at 469) (emphasis added)
Should
argument,

it

the

remains

Court

consider

somewhat

COOK's

surprising

belated

after

three

hearings in the court below and an appeal to this Court
on

the

issues

of

reservation,

the

validity of a Quit

Claim Deed, and the use of the mineral estate involved,
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that COOK would contend she has not been advised of the
basis for

severance of the mineral estate.

in her own brief,

COOK notes

" [ s] everance may be effected by

~

or by reservation or by adverse possession" (Appellant's
Br i e f

pg .

17 ) .

Each of

the primary

issues in this

action constitute a basis for severance and THORNOCK has
raised those issues at each stage of the proceedings in
this action.
Without question, COOK has received notice of
the bases for

severance of the mineral estate from the

surface estate in this action.

B.
THORNOCK'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
COMPLIES WITH THE REQUIREMENTS
OF RULE 56, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
COOK also
plaintiffs

did

for

the

first

time, that

not sufficiently specify the basis for

summary judgment
Rule

urges,

in
56,

their Motion for

Summary Judgment.

Q!~!!-~~~~-of_f_ivi_!._~.E.9.~du!!1

provides in pertinent part:
(a) Claimant.
A party seeking
to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory judgment may, at any
time after the expiration of 20 days
from the commencement of the action
or after service of a motion for
summary judgment by the adverse
party, move with or without sup~ort
ing affidavits for summary Judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
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THORNOCK' s

Motion

clearly

complies

with

the

requirements of Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
in that it asserts by implication that there exists no
question

of

fact

and

that

plaintiffs

are entitled

to

judgment as a matter of law.
Rule 56 contains no requirements that each of
the various

grounds

which might

exist

specificity.

for

the grant of summary judgment

in a given case be enumerated with

If

this

Court were

to

accept COOK' s

contention that such an enumeration is essential to the
grant of summary judgment, motions for summary judgment
would, of necessity, become lengthy documents containing
denials of every possible defense which might be asserted by the opposing party either at hearing or subsequently on appeal.
COOK

has

emphasized

in

her

recent

brief,

that she did not raise the issue of adverse possession
until after the filing of THORNOCK's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
heard

to

argument

In view of this factor,
protest

the

a

response

to

this

in THORNOCK' s Memorandum in Support of Motion

for Summary Judgment
itself.

inclusion of

COOK should not be

(R.55),

At any rate,

rather than in the motion

there is no question that the

issues of adverse possession and severance were raised
and addressed before the court below.

- 15 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

COOK'S

suggestion

that

a

Motion

for

summary

Judgment must delineate each and every basis upon which
summary

judgment

comport with
the

law of

THORNOCK' s

the
the

might

be

granted

simply

does not

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or with
State

Motion for

of

Utah.

For

that reason,

Summary Judgment was properly

before the court below.

c.
COOK DID NOT OBTAIN TITLE TO THE
MINERAL RIGHTS OF 353 ACRES BY
ADVERSE POSSESSION
COOK
Petition

for

asserts,
Rehearing,

for

the

that

the

first

time,

mineral

in her

and surface

estates were not effectively severed.
Simply

stated,

three

separate

conveyances

serve to sever the mineral from the surface estate; they
are,

the reservation of mineral rights in the THORNOCK-

Johnson

and

Johnson-COOK

mineral

rights

in

the

deeds

and

the

COOK-THORNOCK

conveyance of

Quit

Claim Deed.

(R. 219,220 and 224, respectively).
COOK

now argues,

for

the

first

time,

before

this Court, that the reservation of mineral rights found
in the THORNOCK-Johnson and Johnson-COOK warranty De~s
is insufficient to reserve those mineral rights to the
granter.

The

court below

found

that

the language of

reservation contained in those documents was the result
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of a scrivener error and held, as a matter of law, that
the

reservation

clauses

serve

rights to the gr an tor.
finding

on

appeal,

to

reserve

the mineral

As COOK did not object to this

she

is precluded

from objecting

to it at this point.
COOK further
ineffective
mineral

to

asserts that the reservation is

create

estates

for

a

severance of

the surface

the reason that

and

there exists a

defect in her chain of title.
COOK's rationale is that because her predecessors in interest allegedly lacked title to the 353 acres
in question,

she obtained title by adverse possession.

This

is

theory

somewhat

purposes of argument,

interesting,

however,

for

should the court apply it to the

case at hand it is simi;arly applicable to Lawrence
Johnson and his predecessors in interest.
The chain of title to the disputed 353 acres
may be traced to a warranty Deed, dated April 1, 1941,
whereby Joseph and Katherine Hatch conveyed the entire
1,946 acres
THORNOCK

and

to

their

Johnson,

four
as

daughters
well

as

(R.

their

245).

As

heirs,

may

similarly assert title to the entire property by virtue
of adverse possession, the reservation clause contained
in the

Johnson-COOK warranty Deed

effectively severed

the mineral and surface estates as to the entire parcel
conveyed, including the disputed 353 acres.
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This Court

in Michael v. Salt Lake Inc., 9

Utah 2d 370,

345 P.2d 200

that

context

in

the

written

of

instrument,

claimant's

(1959),

impliedly recognized

adverse

possession

under a

periods of possession by the

predecessors-in-interest may be

included in

establishing adverse possession.
Through

application of

the

theory of adverse

possession as it is advanced by COOK,

it is clear that

her

B.

predecessor-in-interest,

obtained

title

to

the

adverse possession.
predecessors

in

353

Lawrence
acres

Johnson,

had

in dispute through

The periods of possession of his

interest may

be

"tacked"

to

his own.

In short, title to the disputed 353 acres was vested in
Lawrence B. Johnson at the time of his conveyance of the
entire 1, 946 acres to LOIS

s.

COOK and Howland J. Cook,

appellant's deceased husband.
As Johnson held title by adverse possession ~
the 353 acres at the time of his conveyance of the sue
to COOK,

the

reservation clause contained in the

Johnson-COOK deed
the

granter

all

(R.

220)

mineral

was effective to reserve to
rights,

thereby

surface estate from the mineral estate.
is,

of

course,

sufficient

severing the
This severance

to preclude COOK's claim by

adverse possession to the mineral rights.
In addition, the COOK-THORNOCK QUl· t Claim need
serves to sever

the surface and mineral estates.
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validity of that deed is discussed above and will not be
addressed here.

However, in addition to urging that the

deed is invalid, COOK argues that no interest in the 353
acres was conveyed by virtue of that deed because she
did not

have

question.

title

to

that portion of the land in

Assuming for the sake of argument that the

nature of COOK's possession of the minerals in question
subsequent

to

the

Johnson-COOK deed

is

sufficient to

establish adverse possession, COOK had acquired title at
the time of execution of the COOK-THORNOCK Quit Claim
Deed.

This is because the period of possession of her

predecessor-in-interest,

Lawrence

Johnson,

may

be

"tacked" to her period of possession.
There

is no question that COOK entered into

possession of the subject land under claim of title
based upon a written 'instrument.

In this context,

periods of occupancy by the claimant's predecessor-ininterest are included in calculations of the period of
adverse possession.

As noted above,

the period of

adverse possession of the 353 disputed acres began on
April 1,

1941, with the conveyance by Joseph and

Katherine Hatch to their four daughters (R.245).
Therefore, COOK had title, by adverse possession, to the
353 acres at the time of the COOK-THORNOCK Quit Claim
Deed.

For this reason, the Quit-Claim Deed also serves
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to sever mineral and surface estates, thereby precluding
COOK's subsequent claim by adverse possession.
On the record before

this Court,

there is no

question that the mineral and surface estates have been
severed,

therefore

COOK' s

purported

adverse possession

of the surface does not extend to minerals.
D.
COOK IS PRECLUDED FROM SIMULTANEOUSLY
ASSERTING A DEFECT IN HER CHAIN
OF TITLE AND TITLE BY
ADVERSE POSSESSION AGAINST THE
RECORD TITLE HOLDER
Apparently in response to this Court's holding
that

COOK' s

defective

allegation

serves

THORNOCK's title,

to

that

defeat

her

her

chain of

standing

to

title is
challenge

COOK again argues that she may simul-

taneously assert and deny her claim of title.
at 55 Am.Jur. 2d QUIETING TITLE §45:
One cannot defeat a quiet title
bill by showing that the complainants claim or interest •
. is
subject to superior rights in third
persons who are not parties to the
suit; i t is sufficient that the
interest asserted by complainant in
possession be superior to that of
those who are parties defendant.
In
this regard, it has been said that
the court determines the rights of
the parties under the pleadings and
evidence, grants proper relief, and
determines the better title as
between the parties to the proceeding, though a title superior to
the rights of either party may be
held by a stranger to the suit.
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As no~d

Without question, COOK entered into possession
of the property in question under a claim founded upon a
written instrument.
chain of title,

By denying the validity of her

she simultaneously denies the val id i ty

of her claim of title, thereby precluding her assertion
of title by adverse possession.
E.

IN THE PRESENT CASE, SEVERANCE
OF THE MINERAL AND SURFACE ESTATES
IS NOT A QUESTION OF FACT
COOK argues that the severance of mineral and
surface estates is, by its very nature, an issue of
fact.

In

sole support of this proposition she cites

Toth v. Bigelow, 1 N.J. 399, 64 A.2d 62 (1949).
In Toth,
quiet

title.

allegations

the plaintiff brought an action to

Defendant
of

the

answered,

plaintiff's

denying

certain

Complaint,

thereby

placing the jurisdiction of the New Jersey Court of
Chancery in issue.

The matter

then came on for pre-

liminary hearing as to the jurisdictional issue and
defendant's

request

for

dismissal was denied.

It is

important to note, that at this juncture, only pleadings
containing allegations had been exchanged.

From this

denial, defendant appealed.
On appeal, the sole issue before the court was
the existence of jurisdiction in the Court of Chancery.
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That jurisdiction was challenged upon two grounds.
the court stated,

As

[t]he first of these is the

allegation that the respondent is not in possession of
the land in question within the meaning of the statute"
(64 A.2d at 63)

(emphasis added).

In their pleadings,

bot~.

parties claimed title

to the mineral estate through different chains of title,
both of which
mineral

involved a

estates.

severance of

In order

the surface and

to maintain a Bill in

Chancery, plaintiff would had to have proved possession
of the mineral estate under color of title.

Of course,

this possession was challenged by the allegation of
severance.
In addressing

this

supra, noted that it was "

issue,

the court in Toth,

. met at the outset by the

preliminary question of whether it is necessary at this
time to enter into an examination and interpretation of
the instruments and their respective chains of title · ·
(64 A.2d

at 64).

The court appraised the issue

confronting it as follows:
In its essential elements the
question is whether possession of
the surface carries with it possession of the minerals underneath it
in the face of an all~.9....§.!i_on of
severance by a prior common
owner . .
(64 A.2d at 64) (emphasis added)
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Confronted only with the allegations contained
in pleadings, the court held that a mere allegation of
severance was not

sufficient to deprive

Chancery of jurisdiction.

the Court of

That court then noted that

the appellant would be afforded an opportunity to prove
the severance as the action followed its normal course.
(64 A.2d at 64).
In

essence,

the court,

in Toth, merely held

that an allegation of severance of mineral and surface
estates was not sufficient to deprive the Court of
Chancery of jurisdiction.

In the posture of that case,

as it was presented upon appeal, the court was unable to
render a decision upon the validity of the severance and
it so stated.
The

stateme~t

Support of Rehearing,

as contained in COOK's Brief in
at page 25,

to the effect that

"[t] he New Jersey Supreme Court held that the issue of
interpretation of the deeds and of severance pertained
to the merits of the case and should be resolved at
trial
note that,

is correct.

However, COOK fails to

in Toth, the issue before the New Jersey

court was not the validity of the severance, rather it
was the existence of jurisdiction, and, most importantly, the record before that court consisted only of the
allegations

contained in pleadings.

-

For that reason,
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that court could not have ruled on the validity of the
severance.
The

court's dee is ion in Toth is distinguish-

able from the present case on procedural,
legal bases.

factual, and

Toth is simply inapposite!

A careful

reading of Toth reveals that it does not stand for the
proposition that severance is,

by its nature, an issue

of fact.
F.

COOK HAS NOT ADVERSELY POSSESSED
THE MINERAL ESTATE IN QUESTION
Assuming,

for purposes of argument, that COOK

entered into adverse possession of the mineral estate of
the 353 acres in question, she did so under a claim of
title

founded

upon a

written

Johnson-COOK Warranty Deed.

instrument,
Therefore,

that is, the
the provisions

of Sections 78-12-7 and -9, Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol.9A
1977) are applicable.

Pursuant
claimant must

have

to

those

provisions,

exclusive

and

the

adverse

hostile adverse pos-

session for a period of seven years before the claim by
adverse possession ripens.
The undisputed facts on the record before this
of the real
·
Court are that COOK entered into possession
property in question by Warranty Deed dated December 11
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1952 (R. 220).

On July 19, 1958, THORNOCK's predecessor

in interest, Aden W. Thornock and Lucille Thornock, his
wife, executed an Oil & Gas Lease whereby one J. R.
Williams obtained mineral lease rights to a substantial
portion

of

the

real

property

title by adverse possession.

to which COOK claims

(~_.

91,93).

This lease was

recorded in the office of the Rich County Recorder on
November 2, 1958.
Both
recordation
entered

the

execution

were within

of

this

seven years of

lease and

its

the date COOK

into possession of the real property in ques-

tion.
By virtue of the execution and recordation of
this Oil & Gas Lease, COOK'S possession was neither
Indeed,

exclusive nor hostile.
conveyance of an
under the law,

as the recording of a

interest in real property is deemed,

to provide notice to the world, COOK'S

failure to object or protest this conveyance constitutes
acquiescence

in the

use of the mineral estate, and

assertion of ownership by THORNOCK.
Because COOK's possession was
clusive nor hostile,

neither

ex-

she did not adversely possess the

mineral estate in question for a period of seven years,
as

required

by

78-12-7,

Utah Code Ann.

(Rep!. Vol.

9A

1977), therefore as a matter of law her claim by adverse
possession must fail.
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CONCLUSION
For

the

reasons

set

forth

above,

Appellants

Petition for Rehearing should be denied.
Respectfully submitted this

~ day of February, 1980
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